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Abstract
This paper deals with the social welfare consequences of the stagnation of Latin American growth 
per capita during the far-reaching economic and social changes that took place during the pe-
riod 1980-2003. This period of transformation saw large-scale foreign actors gradually increase 
their economic and political power in Latin America, with negative consequences for domestic 
economies, especially in terms of increasing income inequality and rising poverty. The only major 
tendency mitigating these adverse trends was an increase in public expenditure in the social sector 
during the 1990s, which offset, but did not eliminate, the increased inequality associated with the 
economic transformation.
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Pedro Sáinz1
This paper analyses the evolution of equity and inequality in Latin America from the 1990s until 2003 in 
the context of growing liberalization and globalization. The ﬁ  rst section reviews recent economic changes 
and their social repercussions, and includes a description of macroeconomic policies and reforms. The 
second section examines social policy objectives since the 1990s, with close attention to changes in 
orientation resulting from the reforms. The third section evaluates the status of poverty and equity during 
recent political changes.
Openness, economic change and equity
During the 1980s and 1990s, Latin America underwent profound economic changes, caused mainly by ex-
ternal inﬂ  uences. Multinational banks had played a major role in the indebtedness of the 1970s, while the 
Bretton Woods institutions and some developed countries, especially the United States of America, led the 
process of renegotiation of countries’ external debt during the 1980s. These same actors strongly promot-
ed institutional and macroeconomic reform during the 1990s, which lay at the core of the major economic 
transformation that replaced the previous government-led industrialization with a new system based on 
the dominant role of transnational corporations (TNCs).2 This economic transformation cannot be ex-
plained without reference to recent policies associated with the present international economic order.3
Macroeconomic features
During the 1990s, external capital movements, growth instability and the stagnation of per capita 
income since over two decades converged to decrease equity and increase poverty in Latin American 
economies.
Since the oil crisis in 1973, the region has experienced massive changes in its balance of payments. 
From the middle of the 1930s up to that time, the current account approach had been dominant, but after the 
crisis, capital account transactions became more frequent. This had signiﬁ  cant macroeconomic consequenc-
es. Foreign trade was, on many occasions, responsive to situations associated with capital movements, e.g., 
increased imports with strong capital inﬂ  ows, ﬁ  xed exchange rates and easy access to credit for consumers.
From 1975 to 1981, the Latin American region became heavily indebted and funds were often 
misused, leading to the crisis of 1981-1982. The 1980s saw huge negative transfers effected to pay off 
national debts, with consequent negative growth rates in per capita income. From 1990 to 2001, there were 
again net capital inﬂ  ows, with larger shares of foreign direct investment (FDI). In many cases, such invest-
ments were used to buy existing assets, not to increase ﬁ  xed capital. Investment made recovery possible, 
1  The author has heavily used ECLAC documents, especially ECLAC (2004b), of which he was coauthor. The 
author wishes to express his gratitude to Adolfo Gurrieri for his comments and suggestions.
2  The disarticulation process is described in Sáinz and Calcagno (1992). 
3  For the inﬂ  uence of policies on globalization, see Ocampo (2001).2  DESA Working Paper No. 22
albeit at slow growth rates, and was a signiﬁ  cant factor in bringing about economic change. From 1998 to 
2003, the region suffered from stagnation, as net capital inﬂ  ows became negative again; the cumulative net 
transfer out of the region between 1975 and 2003 was $62 billion.
Macroeconomic policies were constrained by the restrictive conditions associated with freer 
capital movements. On many occasions, governments and other actors became highly indebted, which 
in turn limited their options for action. For example, in 2003, the high level of government indebtedness 
in Argentina and Brazil created economic and social complications, and limited government freedom to 
expand social policies, although these were urgently needed.
The long-term outcome of the reforms was disappointing. From 1980 to 2003, per capita GDP in 
the region (in 1995 US dollars) increased by only 3.4 per cent. Also, vulnerability, instability, limited eco-
nomic policy instruments, and long-term economic stagnation had an adverse affect on equity and deepened 
poverty, especially during periods of crisis.
New actors and asset distribution
The debt crisis of the 1980s and the reforms of the 1990s led to economic changes and redistribution of 
assets. Since the beginning of the 1980s, external capital movements have had a signiﬁ  cant effect on the 
economic health of enterprises. The devaluations that followed the debt crisis forced heavily indebted 
enterprises into bankruptcy, particularly those that had been borrowing during the 1970s, when access to 
foreign ﬁ  nancial resources had been easy (see ECLAC, 1984). The weakness of domestic demand follow-
ing the 1981-1982 crisis compounded these difﬁ  culties, and prevented the creation of a trade surplus. These 
circumstances allowed foreign TNCs to displace domestic ﬁ  rms, especially in the second half of the 1990s. 
Economic openness, especially in countries that used the exchange rate to control inﬂ  ation, created even 
more severe problems for national enterprises producing tradable goods.
Transnational enterprises thus gained greater production and market share. In 1996, as public 
enterprises were declining in number, TNCs represented half of the 100 major enterprises. Although in 
1990, TNCs had accounted for only 25 per cent of total sales of the 500 major enterprises, by 1999 when 
FDI reached its highest level, their share peaked at 43 per cent. In 1996, sales of the major 100 enterprises 
represented around 10 per cent of GDP, and those of the top 500 around one third of GDP.
TNCs have long had a strong presence in the manufacturing and services sectors. Many medium 
and high-technology industries (automotive, auto parts, electronics) are largely dominated by TNCs, 
which have concentrated their operations in assembly plants located in Mexico and, to a lesser extent, in 
Argentina and Brazil. Along with medium and high-technology industries, a wide range of low-technol-
ogy manufacturing industries also operate assembly plants located in Mexico and the Caribbean.
The services sector also has a broad-based TNC presence, which has been growing steadily since 
economic reforms were implemented to privatize, deregulate and liberalize public utilities in most coun-
tries in the region. In the second half of the 1990s, this sector received the largest FDI inﬂ  ows. The new 
regulatory context for the provision of public utilities allowed TNCs to gain ground by purchasing state-
owned assets, mainly in energy, telecommunications, ﬁ  nance and infrastructure. This process explains the 
declining role of the largest ﬁ  rms in the primary and manufacturing sectors, although the latter still has 
the largest overall TNC presence (see ECLAC, 2004a). During the latter part of the 1990s (1996-2000), Equity in Latin America Since the 1990s  3
TNC sales in Brazil increased from 26.6 to 41.8 per cent of total sales, while employment in TNCs de-
creased from 17.0 to 10.9 per cent (Barros de Castro, 2003).
Transnational and large-scale national enterprises imposed new models of production with a high 
degree of standardization and interchange of inputs produced in different countries. Administrative re-
forms were also introduced. Employment and supply aspects of the rise of transnational enterprises caused 
net unemployment after introducing technical innovations with little more ﬁ  xed capital. Types of products 
from the region also changed with the international pattern of consumption. Surviving large and medium-
sized national enterprises adopted, to different degrees, new administrative patterns, conducive to higher 
productivity and net unemployment. This new pattern also contributed to inequality. In terms of inputs, 
products from other transnational factories replaced domestic suppliers, leading to pressure on the trade bal-
ance and slower technical progress, thus increasing inequality.
The social strata associated with the top national and international enterprises beneﬁ  ted from the 
system, but many who lost their jobs had to ﬁ  nd employment in low productivity enterprises. More impor-
tantly, perhaps, the youth and women trying to enter the labour market for the ﬁ  rst time had increasing dif-
ﬁ  culty in ﬁ  nding jobs that could guarantee minimal welfare. After ten years, workers performing the same 
job functions received the same real income, despite having on average two more years of education (see 
ECLAC, 2004b).
In short, in the period under review, Latin America experienced signiﬁ  cant economic change, with 
reduced ﬁ  xed capital investment and stronger external deﬂ  ationary macroeconomic pressures than earlier. A 
majority of people failed to adjust to the new circumstances and became net losers in terms of both income 
and equity. While growth may be good for the poor, these reforms in Latin America resulted in slower 
growth and even stagnation, as well as greater inequality.
Labour market
The uneven evolution of employment, productivity and income in the labour market played a central role 
in economic and social changes in Latin America. Large disparities in performance between large and 
small enterprises were a feature of the 1980s and 1990s. Large-scale enterprises recorded high rates of 
productivity growth with a shrinking labour force, while small enterprises and self-employment continued 
to grow and be associated with low productivity. In the 1990s, growth in production in the tradable sector 
was practically equal to that of the non-tradable sector, at an annual average growth rate of nearly 3 per 
cent. Non-tradables grew faster in most countries except Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Peru and Venezuela.
The low rate of job creation in the tradable sector was evident even in those countries where the 
sector’s output increased relatively quickly. In Argentina, for example, the GDP of the tradable sector ex-
panded at an annual rate of 3.6 per cent, while the change in total employment was -1.3 per cent. In Bra-
zil, these ﬁ  gures were 2.4 per cent and 0.2 per cent respectively; in Chile, 5.6 per cent and -0.4 per cent; 
in Colombia, 1.7 per cent and -0.1 per cent; in Costa Rica, 5.5 per cent and 1.3 per cent; in Mexico, 3.4 
per cent and 1.7 per cent; in Panama, 3.0 per cent and -0.6 per cent; in Uruguay, 1.1 per cent and -1.1 per 
cent; and in Venezuela, 2.7 per cent and 0.7 per cent. In some smaller and less developed countries, how-
ever, the tradable sector diverged from this trend. In El Salvador, for example, employment in the tradable 
sector grew by 3.6 per cent, while total employment expanded by 3.5 per cent. In Honduras, employment 4  DESA Working Paper No. 22
in the tradable sector expanded by 3.2 per cent, and total employment by 2.9 per cent; in Nicaragua, these 
ﬁ  gures were 4.3 per cent and 3.9 per cent respectively.
In urban areas, creation of jobs differed between the tradable and non-tradable sectors, as it did 
between the formal and informal sectors. In most Latin American countries, employment expanded faster 
in sectors that produce non-tradable goods and services (see Table 1).4 The two sectors’ respective capaci-
ties to increase productivity and generate employment have evolved separately. In general, the tradable 
sector absorbed little labour, but achieved productivity gains. By contrast, the non-tradable sector showed 
a greater capacity to generate employment, but at the cost of low or negative rates of productivity growth.
The low rate of job creation in the tradable sector is evident even in countries where the sector’s 
output has increased relatively quickly. This atypical trend can be observed in the development of the 
maquila industry. Although rising production of tradable goods helped to increase productivity, its effects 
on employment were weak except in countries with a growing maquila sector (Mexico and some of the 
Central American and Caribbean countries).
Although the maquila industry has generated employment, it has shown little capacity to increase 
productivity, and therefore cannot be expected to become the basis for a regional strategy for economic 
growth and employment in the medium or long term. Furthermore, in most recent years, this industry has 
lost ground to Chinese exports. In general, the responsibility for generating employment has fallen on the 
non-tradable sector, but this sector has not generated enough jobs.
The general asymmetry between the tradable and non-tradable sectors not only accentuated the 
heterogeneity of Latin American economies, but also had an impact on labour markets. The gap between 
the incomes of wage earners with different levels of schooling has widened, as the modernization of cer-
tain occupations has paralleled an increasing casualization of the workforce. Since there is little unem-
ployment protection in Latin America, most workers prefer to avoid unemployment by turning to low-pro-
ductivity, low-income jobs, as had been the trend in the 1980s and 1990s, although open unemployment 
also rose in the latter decade.
Much debate has surrounded the question of whether or not the tertiarization of employment is 
conducive to modernization. The answer depends on whether tertiarization is due to economic growth or 
the lack of momentum in the economy, which drives workers to seek employment in commerce and ser-
vices. The two processes coexist in Latin America, although casualization prevails over modernization.
In effect, the 1990s saw intensive tertiarization, with 66 per cent of all new urban jobs generated 
in the informal sector5 (see Table 2). Unskilled self-employed workers in commerce and services regis-
tered the largest increase (24.2 per cent), followed by workers (both employers and employees) in micro 
enterprises (18.2 per cent), domestic workers (9.4 per cent), unskilled self-employed workers in industry 
and construction (8.1 per cent), and in primary occupations (6 per cent). Most of these jobs were of low 
quality, reﬂ  ecting the urban economy’s poor capacity to raise labour productivity. This conclusion holds 
true for most of the 17 countries considered, particularly the most heavily populated ones, such as Bra-
4  In a number of countries, some non-tradable services, such as segments of the tourism sector, may be signiﬁ  cant. 
However, since the national accounts estimates of most of the countries do not identify the amounts corresponding 
to these segments, growth rates in the tradable sector may, to some extent, be underestimated in cases where they 
are representative and have expanded rapidly.
5  For detailed information, see ECLAC (2004b).Equity in Latin America Since the 1990s  5
Table 1:
Total and wage employment in 16 Latin American countries, 1990-1999










Costa Rica 3.7 1.3 5.2 4.5 3.2 5.2
[2.1] [3.7] [2.9] [3.5]
El Salvadord 4.3 3.5 4.6 4.8 4.0 5.1
[4.1] [2.2] [5.2] [3.7]
Guatemala 3.6 2.2 5.6 2.7 2.9 2.6
[6.0] [2.3] [4.4] -[0.3]
Honduras 3.9 2.9 5.2 3.0 2.3 3.4
[6.6] [4.4] [7.3] [3.8]
Mexico 3.0 1.7 3.9 2.6 1.7 2.1
[4.0] [4.6] [3.4] [3.9]
Nicaragua 3.5 3.9 3.3 3.6 5.8 2.5
[1.2] [1.6] [4.0] [3.2]
Panama 3.5 -0.6 5.6 4.1 1.7 4.8
[3.5] [2.7] [3.5] [2.4]
Subtotal
(weighted average) 3.2 1.8 4.1 2.8 2.0 2.7
[4.1] [4.3] [3.6] [3.6]
Argentinad 1.2 -1.3 1.7 1.6 -1.4 2.5
-[1.5] [2.2] -[1.6] [2.4]
Boliviad 5.0 7.6 4.4 3.8 3.6 3.9
[8.1] -[0.9] [4.9] [1.5]
Brazil 1.6 0.2 2.4 1.7 0.2 2.5
[0.3] [2.4] [0.2] [2.8]
Chile 2.3 -0.4 3.6 2.8 -0.1 4.3
-[0.2] [4.6] [0.0] [6.0]
Colombia 1.7 -0.1 2.8 1.2 0.2 1.9
-[0.4] [3.1] -[0.4] [2.1]
Ecuadord 3.6 2.2 4.1 3.5 1.6 4.1
[1.4] [4.2] [0.6] [3.1]
Paraguaye 4.1 3.9 4.1 4.7 4.7 4.7
[4.5] [3.3] [5.6] [3.5]
Uruguayd 1.2 -1.1 1.8 1.5 -0.3 2.0
-[1.8] [1.0] -[2.0] [1.1]
Venezuela 2.7 0.7 3.4 1.5 0.1 2.0
[1.6] [2.5] -[0.3] [1.3]
Subtotal
(weighted average) 1.8 0.2 2.6 1.8 0.1 2.5
[0.2] [2.5] -[0.1] [2.6]
Total (weighted average) 2.2 0.8 3.0 2.1 0.7 2.6
[1.5] [2.9] [0.9] [2.9]
Source: ECLAC; estimates based on data tabulations from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  Figures are for wage earners between the ages of 25 and 59, working 20 hours or more per week.
b The  ﬁ  gures in brackets refer to manufacturing.
c The  ﬁ  gures in brackets refer to government, social, community and personal services.
d  Total for urban areas.
e  Asunción and the Central Department.6  DESA Working Paper No. 22
zil, Colombia and Mexico. In Argentina and Chile, by contrast, most new jobs were in the formal sector, 
although Argentina also recorded a substantial increase in open unemployment.
As a result of these patterns, informal employment expanded from 41.0 per cent of total employ-
ment in 1990 to 46.3 per cent in 1999. The contraction of the formal sector reﬂ  ected a decline in the pro-
portion of private sector employees other than professionals and technicians, from 35.9 to 29.1 per cent, 
and in the proportion of public sector employees, from 16.0 to 12.9 per cent. These relative decreases 
were not fully offset by increases in the share of professionals and technicians working in the private sec-
tor (from 4.7 to 7.8 per cent) and that of employers and independent professionals and technicians (from 
3.8 to 4.3 per cent). Consequently, in 1990, value-added per employee was only 84 per cent of what it had 
been in 1980; in 2000, it was 93 per cent of the 1980 value, and in 2003, 90 per cent.
The wage gap between different segments of the workforce also widened. In general, occupa-
tional earnings were slow to increase, and grew at a lower rate than per capita income. Moreover, in 
most countries, these increases were too small to bring earnings back up to the levels recorded before the 
crisis of the 1980s. In almost every case, income increases reﬂ  ected a combination of a large increase in 
the earnings of workers employed in the fastest-growing productivity activities of the modern sector and 
a slower (or even negative) growth of the earnings of all other urban workers. As a result, income gaps 
between the formal and informal sectors and between skilled and less skilled workers grew even wider 
(ECLAC, 2002).
Table 2:
Distribution of urban employed in Latin America by 









Total employed persons 100.0 100.0 100.0 26 216
Total formal sector  58.9 53.6 34.1 8 933
Public sector  16.0 12.9 2.1 551
Private sector 44.4 41.3 32.0 8 382
Employers, independent professionals and technicians  3.8 4.3 6.5 1 703
Employees 40.6 36.9 25.5 6 679
Professionals and technicians 4.7 7.8 20.1 5 260
Non-professional, non-technical workers 35.9 29.1 5.4 1 419
Total informal sector 41.0 46.3 65.9 17 284
Employment in microenterprisesa 14.7 15.5 18.2 4 784
Domestic employment 5.4 6.3 9.4 2 466
Unskilled self-employed workers:  22.3 25.8 38.3 10 034
In agriculture, forestry, hunting and ﬁ  shing 2.2 3.0 5.9 1 559
In industry and construction 4.3 5.2 8.1 2 131
In commerce and services 15.8 17.7 24.2 6 344
Source: ECLAC; from data tabulations of household surveys conducted in the various countries.
a  Includes employers and employees in ﬁ  rms with up to ﬁ  ve workers.Equity in Latin America Since the 1990s  7
Wage disparities between the formal and informal sectors increased in all countries for which data 
are available. The same was true for the average income of workers in these sectors in all countries in the 
study except Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama. Within each sector, income disparities between workers 
in higher and lower-skilled jobs also increased in every country except Argentina.6 By contrast, and with 
few exceptions, income disparities between men and women tended to narrow. The main exception was 
Panama, where these disparities were smaller than in any other country in the region.
Poor and households with low per capita income generally experienced higher unemployment. 
During the 1990s, open unemployment in Latin America rose from 4.6 to 8.6 per cent, climbing steadily 
in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, although only at half the rate in Brazil compared to the other two 
countries. Unemployment also increased in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
In Chile, it did not begin to rise until 1998, after having gone down since the beginning of the decade. By 
contrast, unemployment declined in Mexico and most Central American and Caribbean countries. After 
it recovered from the effects of the 1995 crisis, urban unemployment in Mexico declined to about 2.5 per 
cent. The ﬁ  gure also dropped in some Central American countries, such as El Salvador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua, while it stayed relatively moderate in Costa Rica.
Unemployment continued to affect the lower income groups the most. In 17 Latin American 
countries, and in the group of 8 countries that experienced a rapid increase in unemployment between the 
mid- and late 1990s,7 the share of unemployed among the poorest 40 per cent of the population (quintiles 
I and II) continued to be considerably higher than the overall rate of unemployment, and, between 1994 
and 1999, it increased signiﬁ  cantly. Unemployment also rose in another 40 per cent of households (quin-
tiles III and IV), particularly in the 8 countries worst affected by the crisis. Urban unemployment even 
increased among the highest-earning quintile. At the end of the decade, the three quintiles with the highest 
incomes recorded rates of unemployment twice as high—and in some countries, three times as high—as 
the rates that had prevailed in the middle of the decade.
From these changes in the labour market, primary income distribution became more unequal, as 
will be discussed in more detail below. Differences in unemployment and wages rose—both between pro-
fessionals and non-professionals as well as between the formal and informal sectors. Public employment, 
which historically had provided comparatively higher incomes, lost importance vis-à-vis private employ-
ment. This also contributed to increasing inequality of income distribution.
Social policies
Objectives
In the 1980s and 1990s, social policy proposals changed signiﬁ  cantly. There was great conﬁ  dence that 
countries would achieve higher rates of economic growth, with social policies playing a complementary 
role by ensuring more equity of opportunity.
In terms of equity objectives, governments generally preferred poverty alleviation measures to 
policies that sought to redress income inequality. This was in accordance with the dominant neoliberal 
6  Argentina’s situation is not fully comparable to that of other Latin American countries, owing to the great increase 
in its open unemployment rate.
7  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela.8  DESA Working Paper No. 22
argument, that capital would promote economic growth, which in turn was generally considered the best 
way to alleviate poverty. It was thought that emphasis on income redistribution, e.g., through higher taxes, 
would slow investment and growth, and therefore negatively affect the poor. Furthermore, if the public 
sector refrained from participating in the production of goods and commercial services, resources would 
be freed for public (social) expenditure, which would allow for increased education and health spending 
as well as direct transfers to the poor. It was also argued that there was a broad need for greater efﬁ  ciency 
in public expenditure, both through the use of better technical solutions and by concentrating on the poor 
and reducing expenditure for strata which could manage without public assistance.
According to this view, the market would ensure economic growth, which in turn would reduce 
poverty, while the public sector could concentrate on social policy and equity through investment in hu-
man capital. In the 1990s, other objectives, such as safety nets, were added, in view of the repeated crises 
that rendered the labour market vulnerable, especially for the poor. Proposals relating to social capital and 
empowerment of the poor were also added to the policy agenda, with little success.
The inﬂ  uence of the United Nations was important in issues of equity. The UN’s international con-
ferences forced countries to incorporate human rights considerations, as well as democratic rights into their 
national constitution and legislation. The Copenhagen Summit set various social policy objectives, e.g., on 
equity, poverty and employment, and critics of neoliberal policies pointed out that reality was far from sat-
isfactory in many respects.8 The 2000 Millennium Declaration also raised issues relating to poverty, equity 
and international cooperation. Furthermore, a critical evaluation of social policies was gaining momentum.
The ageing of the population and the consequent reduction in the proportionate share of children 
and young people in the nation are new phenomena in Latin America. As the family is the main target and 
channel for social policy interventions, these will also have to change in recognition of the implications 
of recent population life-cycle changes. Gender also played an increasingly signiﬁ  cant role in poverty al-
leviation policies in the 1990s, with some progress in women’s education. Financial assistance is increas-




Social expenditure in the form of transfers and human capital formation has been important for poverty 
alleviation both in the short and long term. Social spending rose considerably during the 1990s. In most 
countries, resources allocated to the social sector increased as a result of economic growth, increased bud-
getary pressure and the higher ﬁ  scal priority assigned to social expenditure.9 In 17 countries in the region, 
per capita public spending rose by about 58 per cent on average between 1990-1991 and 2000-2001. From 
an average of $360 per capita at the start of the decade, social expenditure climbed to $540 per capita by 
the end of the decade.10 The only countries that failed to signiﬁ  cantly expand social expenditure were El 
  8  See, for example, the two ECLAC appraisals of the Copenhagen Summit Programme of Action (1997; 2000a). 
  9  In the analysis of public expenditure, ‘social sector’ does not refer to social classes or groups, but rather to health, 
welfare, social security, housing, etc.
10 These  ﬁ  gures are simple averages for all countries in the study; per capita social expenditure is expressed in 1997 
US dollars.Equity in Latin America Since the 1990s  9
Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua (among the countries with low spending levels, or less than or close to 
$100 per capita) and Venezuela (among the countries with intermediate spending levels, or around $400). 
The increases were not uniform throughout the region, and tended to be greater in countries with moder-
ate or low levels of per capita social expenditure. Social expenditure rose by over 100 per cent in Colom-
bia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru, whereas in countries with relatively high 
levels of spending (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and Panama), the increases were somewhat smaller, 
amounting to between 20 and 40 per cent compared to the beginning of the decade.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, countries also made signiﬁ  cant efforts to increase the share 
of GDP allocated to the social sector in order to compensate for the reduction in ﬁ  scal revenue due to a 
lower rate of economic growth. Accordingly, the ratio of social spending to GDP in the region increased 
from 12.1 per cent in 1996-1997 to 13.8 per cent in 2000-2001. This increase was only slightly smaller 
than the rise from 10.1 to 12.1 per cent between 1990/1991 and 1996/1997 (see Table 3). The increase 
was achieved despite a sharp downturn in growth of GDP per capita, which slowed from 2.1 to 0.2 per 
cent over the period. However, from 1998 onward, the economic slowdown and the contraction of GDP 
in a number of countries curbed the expansion of social spending. Although public spending in the social 
sector in the region as a whole continued to increase in per capita terms between 1998 and 2001 (from 
$501 to $552), its growth was slower than before. Per capita social spending expanded by 6.3 per cent a 
year between 1991 and 1997, but by only 4.2 per cent a year between 1998 and 2001 (see Figure 1 and 
Table 3).
The increase in social spending in the 1990s was partly associated with an effort on the part of 
these countries to raise spending levels by boosting government revenues and allocating a larger portion 
to the social sector. Social spending in the region thus climbed from nearly 42 to almost 48 per cent of 
total public expenditure. This trend was common throughout the region, except in Honduras and, to some 
extent, Panama.
Sources: ECLAC, Social Development 
Division, social expenditure database.
a The  ﬁ  rst ﬁ  gure corresponds to the 
average for the two-year period, 1994-
1995.
b  The simple average of the countries, 
excluding Bolivia and El Salvador.
Figure 1:
Public social expenditure per capita in 18 Latin American 
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The combined effect of increased budgetary pressure (public spending share of GDP) and greater 
ﬁ  scal priority for social expenditure (social sector share of total public expenditure) is reﬂ  ected in a 
substantial increase in the share of GDP allocated to public social spending. In the region as a whole, this 
share rose from 10.4 to 13.1 per cent between 1990-1991 and 1998-1999. In any case, it is important to 
keep in mind that, as reﬂ  ected in Figure 1, per capita social expenditure was near or below $100 in the 
poorest countries, which gives an idea of its potential effects and its limitations.
The increase in public social expenditure is especially important because its distribution is more eq-
uitable than the primary income distribution, mainly due to variations in employment and asset ownership. 
Not counting social security payments, the poorer quintile received 28 per cent of expenditure (compared to 
only 4.8 per cent of the primary income distribution), while the richest quintile received 12 per cent (com-
pared to 50.7 per cent of the primary income distribution).
Table 3:




1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001
Argentina 19.3 20.1 21.1 20.0 20.8 21.6
Boliviaa .. .. 12.4 14.6 16.3 17.9
Brazil 18.1 17.7 19.3 17.3 19.3 18.8
Chile 11.7 12.4 12.3 13.0 14.7 16.0
Colombia 6.8 8.1 11.5 15.3 14.0 13.6
Costa Rica 15.6 15.2 15.8 16.8 16.4 18.2
Ecuadorb 5.5 5.8 7.4 8.2 8.1 8.8
El Salvadorc .. 3.1 3.4 3.8 4.1 4.2
Guatemala 3.4 4.1 4.1 4.3 6.0 6.2
Honduras 7.9 8.1 7.8 7.2 7.5 10.0
Mexico 6.5 8.1 8.8 8.5 9.2 9.8
Nicaragua 11.1 10.9 12.2 11.3 13.0 13.2
Panamad 18.6 19.5 19.8 20.9 21.6 25.5
Paraguay 3.1 6.2 7.0 8.0 8.5 8.5
Peru 4.0 5.3 6.7 7.1 7.7 8.0
Dominican Republic 4.3 5.9 6.1 6.0 6.6 7.6
Uruguay 16.9 18.9 20.3 21.3 22.8 23.5
Venezuela 8.5 8.9 7.6 8.3 8.4 11.3
Latin Americae 10.1 10.9 11.7 12.1 12.8 13.8
Source: ECLAC, social expenditure database.
a The  ﬁ  gure in the 1994-1995 coloumn refers to 1995.
b The  ﬁ  gures in the 1990-1991 and 2000-2001 columns refer to 1991 and 1992 respectively.
c The  ﬁ  gure in the 1992-1993 column refers to 1993.
d The  ﬁ  gure in the 2000-2001 column refers to 2000.
e  Simple average for the countries shown, except Bolivia and El Salvador. If these countries are included, then the average for 
Latin America are 11.3% for 1994-1995, 11.7% for 1996-1997, 12.5% for 1998-1999 and 13.5% for 2000-2001.Equity in Latin America Since the 1990s  11
In considering the redistribution effects of increased public social expenditure in these countries, 
it is important to ascertain whether the substantial increase in per capita social expenditure during the 
1990s went to its more progressive components. For the region as a whole, approximately 44 per cent of 
the growth in spending went to education and health (28 and 16 per cent respectively); 51 per cent to so-
cial security, mainly to retirement and other pensions; and the remaining 5 per cent to other expenditures, 
such as housing, drinking water and sanitation. This breakdown seems to indicate that in the region as a 
whole, the increase in spending went to both the most progressive and the least progressive social sectors. 
Furthermore, the equity effects were not uniform throughout the region. In countries with lower per capita 
income levels, spending increases were relatively greater in the more progressive components (education 
and health), accounting for 56 per cent of the total, while social security represented only 20 per cent. In 
contrast, social security accounted for around half the total increase in countries where expenditure was 
the highest.
The substantial increase in spending on education was for the implementation of reform pro-
grammes to improve the quality of and equity in education, especially at the primary and secondary 
levels. These reforms included teacher training and salary increases, the cost of which had a signiﬁ  cant 
impact on the sector’s budget. The rise in current and capital expenditure also contributed to this increase, 
especially in countries that sought to improve their physical and technological infrastructure, update 
teaching methods and materials, and establish systems for measuring educational output.
As for trends in health expenditure, the greatest progress was registered in Argentina, Chile and 
Colombia, where the increase was between $76 and $109 per capita, i.e., much higher than the regional 
average of $28. The biggest increases in spending on social security occurred in countries where that 
component already received a greater share of public resources (in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay). 
In Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the increase ranged between $150 and $200 per capita, and in Uruguay, it 
was just over $500. These increases stemmed from adjustments in retirement beneﬁ  ts and other pensions, 
especially in Uruguay, where four-monthly adjustments were introduced in line with a constitutional 
amendment in 1989. Amortization of liabilities accumulated by the system and increases in coverage and 
beneﬁ  ts also contributed to the increases.
These trends indicate that the increased efforts of those governments that allocated lower shares 
of GDP to their social sectors had a more progressive effect on welfare distribution than did the efforts of 
countries with the highest per capita social expenditure levels where social security—which mostly ben-
eﬁ  ts the middle and high-income strata—accounted for a much larger share of public spending.
Bearing in mind the distributive effects of social expenditure, there is a need to:
Intensify efforts to increase social expenditure, as its level is quite low in most countries in 
the region;
Stabilize the ﬁ  nancing of social expenditure, to forestall the serious adverse effects of spend-
ing cuts during economic downturns; and
Target public social expenditure more accurately, especially in programmes aimed at vulner-
able or poor groups, by reallocating available funds so as to have the most impact.
In short, efforts should be made to maintain or increase resources, manage them more efﬁ  ciently, 
and ensure that the programmes that are ﬁ  nanced have the desired effect on the population segments they 
are intended to beneﬁ  t.
•
•
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Broad social outcomes
Although most governments in the region made poverty reduction an explicit priority, they were more 
cautious about taking steps to boost equity in income distribution. In most countries, progress was made 
with respect to legal equality, protection against discrimination, women’s rights, labour rights and children’s 
rights. Although there has been some delay in ratifying the UN Convention on Indigenous People, many 
constitutions have recognized these rights. However, there has been little progress in other areas, such as the 
right to life, physical integrity and security.11
Poverty alleviation
Global economic stagnation, volatility of growth and economic change not only limited efforts to ﬁ  ght 
poverty, but also had other negative effects due to the asymmetry between growth and poverty. Statistics 
show that increased poverty levels during the economic crisis only partially declined when the econo-
mies returned to pre-crisis per capita income levels. The percentage of the population in poverty in Latin 
America was higher in 2003 (44.0 per cent) than in 1980 (40.5 per cent).
The economic recession, expansion and stagnation that Latin American countries experienced in 
the 1980s and 1990s had a signiﬁ  cant impact on poverty and indigence. Although economic performance 
is not the only factor affecting poverty, there is a clear link between general economic trends and signs 
of poverty. Figure 2 shows how poverty levels changed in the 1980s and 1990s in relation to variations in 
economic growth. In particular, the period between 1990 and 1997, when there was growth and a corre-
sponding reduction in poverty, contrasts with the 1998-1999 biennium, when economic growth virtually 
stood still and poverty increased slightly.
11  For a complete and detailed description and analysis of national legislation improvement and shortcomings, see 
UNDP (2004).
Figure 2:
Annual growth rates of gross domestic product (GDP) and of 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special 
data tabulations from household surveys 
conducted in the respective countries.Equity in Latin America Since the 1990s  13
The link between economic growth and changes in poverty rates was asymmetrical from one 
decade to the next. In the 1980s, per capita output declined by an annual average rate of just under 1 per 
cent, while poverty moved upward. This increase in poverty was not completely offset in the 1990s, even 
though output expanded at nearly 1.4 per cent. In fact, the poor comprised 40.5 per cent of the total popu-
lation in 1980, 48.3 per cent in 1990, 43.5 per cent in 1997 and 43.8 per cent in 1999. Bearing in mind 
that per capita output in 1995 values dropped from $3,654 in 1980 to $3,342 in 1990, and then rose to 
$3,807 in 1999, the ground lost in the 1980s was only partially recovered in the 1990s (see Figure 2 and 
Table 4). The trend during 2000-2003 continued that of 1997-1999.
Changes in the spatial distribution of the population have resulted in poverty today being a largely 
urban phenomenon. In 1999, 134 of the region’s 211 million poor people lived in urban areas and 77 mil-
lion in rural areas. However, the incidence of poverty is still much higher in rural areas (64 per cent) than 
in cities (37 per cent). In addition, as shown in Table 4, poverty is more extreme in rural areas, with most 
of the rural poor being indigent (46 million), while most of the urban poor are non-indigent (91 million).
Migration of poor people from the countryside to cities increased the proportion of urban poor 
in the region’s total poor population. As a result, the urban economy faced the challenge of absorbing a 
larger proportion of the nation’s working-age population and of meeting an increased demand for social 
services. In spite of these challenges, the urban economy was able to absorb rural migrants into jobs at a 
higher level of productivity than what was available at their places of origin.
Of the 211 million Latin Americans living in poverty in 1999, about 22 million lived in house-
holds with a per capita income not less than 90 per cent of the minimum needed to meet basic needs. In 
Table 4:
Poor and indigent households and individuals in Latin America,a 1980-1999
Poorb Indigentc
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural
Mil. % Mil. % Mil. % Mil. % Mil. % Mil. %
Households
1980 24.2 34.7 11.8 25.3 12.4 53.9 10.4 15.0 4.1 8.8 6.3 27.5
1990 39.1 41.0 24.7 35.0 14.4 58.2 16.9 17.7 8.5 12.0 8.4 34.1
1994 38.5 37.5 25.0 31.8 13.5 56.1 16.4 15.9 8.3 10.5 8.1 33.5
1997 39.4 35.5 25.1 29.7 14.3 54.0 16.0 14.4 8.0 9.5 8.0 30.3
1999 41.3 35.3 27.1 29.8 14.2 54.3 16.3 13.9 8.3 9.1 8.0 30.7
Individuals
1980 135.9 40.5 62.9 29.8 73.0 59.9 62.4 18.6 22.5 10.6 39.9 32.7
1990 200.2 48.3 121.7 41.4 78.5 65.4 93.4 22.5 45.0 15.3 48.4 40.4
1994 201.5 45.7 125.9 38.7 75.6 65.1 91.6 20.8 44.3 13.6 47.4 40.8
1997 203.8 43.5 125.7 36.5 78.2 63.0 88.8 19.0 42.2 12.3 46.6 37.6
1999 211.4 43.8 134.2 37.1 77.2 63.7 89.4 18.5 43.0 11.9 46.4 38.3
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special data tabulations from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  Estimates for 19 countries in the region. 
b  Households and population living in poverty. Includes indigent households (population). 
c  Indigent households and population. 14  DESA Working Paper No. 22
other words, close to 10 per cent of the poor were relatively well placed to rise above the poverty line. 
On the other hand, 45 million of the non-poor population were categorized as most at risk of falling into 
poverty, as their income was not more than 25 per cent above the poverty-line. This population group is 
highly vulnerable to economic ﬂ  uctuations, as the slightest negative impact on their income can lead to a 
signiﬁ  cant decline in living standards.
Certain features that go hand in hand with poverty—such as an overcrowded dwelling, an un-
employed head of household and a poor educational environment—exacerbate the vulnerability of poor 
households. These tend to occur in the context of a low-income environment and offer a more complete 
picture of the living standards of the region’s poor.
Income distribution
Historically, Latin America has shown the worst income distribution of the world’s regions. This situa-
tion deteriorated further in the 1980s and the 1990s, even in countries that previously had relatively better 
distributions, such as Argentina, Chile and Venezuela. The fact that, in the late 1990s, the major portion 
of total income in Latin America was earned by the richest 10 per cent of households, who received more 
than 30 per cent, can serve as an illustration of the region’s income distribution. In most countries (except 
El Salvador and Venezuela), that ﬁ  gure was over 35 per cent (45 per cent in Brazil). The average income 
of this decile was 19 times higher than the average for the 40 per cent of households with the lowest 
incomes, who received between 9 and 15 per cent (Uruguay was an exception, with around 22 per cent). 
In the 1990s, the share of total national income accruing to the top 10 per cent of households continued to 
increase in most countries, raising inequality of income distribution in Latin America. During that decade, 
the share of income received by households in the top decile increased in eight countries, declined in ﬁ  ve 
(signiﬁ  cantly so in Honduras12 and Uruguay) and remained steady in Mexico.
A comparison of the average income of various household groups also reﬂ  ects a high degree of 
inequality in Latin America. In Bolivia, Brazil and Nicaragua, the average per capita income of the richest 
quintile (20 per cent of households) were more than 30 times greater than those of the poorest quintile. 
In the other countries, the average was also high, at around 23 times. The ratio of the average income of 
the wealthiest decile to that of the poorest four deciles also underscores the degree of concentration. The 
largest ratio was for Brazil, where the income of the most afﬂ  uent was 32 times greater than the combined 
incomes of the bottom four deciles. The average difference region-wide was 19.3, which is extremely 
high compared to the ratios for Uruguay (8.8) and Costa Rica (12.6), the countries with the lowest income 
inequality in the region.13
The share of income received by the poorest 40 per cent of households differed in the region 
over the decade. The ﬁ  gure fell in ﬁ  ve countries, rose in eight and held steady in Nicaragua. The steep-
est decreases were in Ecuador and Venezuela, countries that experienced major crises, and also in Costa 
12  It should be noted, however, that the data for Honduras for the 1990s may not be fully comparable, owing to 
changes in the income-measurement methodology introduced with the 1994 household survey. These changes—
which had to do with the breadth of the income deﬁ  nition used in the study—may have inﬂ  uenced the data on dis-
tribution of household income in 1990, compared to such data for subsequent years, and thus may have inﬂ  uenced 
analysis of the trend through the decade.
13  Although no ﬁ  gures comparable with those for the rest of the region are available, Cuba has probably maintained 
a less regressive income distribution than the other countries, despite that country’s economic deterioration in the 
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Rica, El Salvador and Mexico. Where there were improvements, they were relatively minor, and sur-
passed two percentage points in only one case—Colombia from 1994 to 1997, but with a slight dete-
rioration from 1997 to 1999. The improvements amounted to more than one percentage point in three 
others—Honduras, Guatemala and Uruguay—and were around 0.5 per cent in Argentina, Brazil, Chile 
and Panama.
Another indicator of income concentration is the percentage of people with a per capita income 
falling below the overall average. Between 67 to 77 per cent of the population in Latin America get less 
than the average per capita income. In most countries, this proportion was smaller at the beginning of the 
1980s. At present, around 75 per cent of households have below-average incomes. Hence, a much larger 
share of the increased per capita GDP has gone to the top 25 per cent of households. Costa Rica and Uru-
guay have the lowest shares of persons receiving less than the average per capita income, while Brazil and 
Guatemala have the highest.
In summary, even though many countries did show a certain economic growth and considerably 
increased social expenditure in the 1990s, Latin America as a whole did not succeed in substantially im-
proving primary income distribution. Although economic growth has made it possible to reduce absolute 
poverty, increased output has not altered the way in which the beneﬁ  ts of growth are distributed, nor are 
there any signs that this situation is likely to change signiﬁ  cantly in the short or medium term.14 Out of 17 
countries analysed, only Honduras and Uruguay had reduced their rates of inequality by the end of the de-
cade. Even in countries that achieved high and sustained growth rates, such as Chile, income distribution 
has not changed, and disparities persist. While social expenditure is presumably progressive, it is insufﬁ  -
cient by itself to compensate for existing economic inequalities.
Sectoral outcomes
Although the preceding review of broad social outcomes provides a useful framework to evaluate changes 
in equity, it is nonetheless necessary to complement the analysis by further examining certain areas which 
speciﬁ  cally inﬂ  uence equity. Increased social expenditure and progress on certain indicators do not, by 
themselves, ensure improved equity. Actual trends in key strategic areas of social policy—such as educa-
tion, health, housing and social protection—must also be considered in this regard.
Education
As mentioned above, the region has increased its public expenditure on education. Policies in this area have 
taken into consideration international recommendations, such as the importance of educating women. 
Much emphasis has also been placed on the need to universalize education. Governments have made 
huge investments to try to ensure universal primary education and to signiﬁ  cantly expand enrolment in 
preschool and secondary education. The gross enrolment rate for primary education is 100 per cent in most 
countries today, while enrolment rates for secondary and tertiary education have also increased, although 
progress remains uneven across countries. Despite these efforts, only around half of those who start pri-
mary education actually complete it.
Although the region made signiﬁ  cant progress in the 1990s, national and international tests suggest 
that there is considerable room for improvement in quality, which is also important for equity. In-depth 
analysis shows the magnitude of related problems in the region, such as the extremely low level of educa-
14  For details of structural factors underlying income distribution, see ECLAC (1998).16  DESA Working Paper No. 22
tion of most parents, the need for children in poorer families to work, and the limited access to educational 
services in poor rural areas. The level of education received by children from poor households is generally 
too low to enable them to break out of the cycle of poverty.
The distribution of educational achievement remains extremely uneven, as inequalities persist and 
are carried over to the next generation, mostly through unequal opportunity and achievement in education. 
ECLAC studies show that, despite efforts to extend the coverage of formal education, socio-economic sta-
tus and family origin continue to determine opportunities for education as well as for social and economic 
mobility. Educational opportunities—and consequently, access to more stable and better-paid employ-
ment—are inherited to a great degree, thus perpetuating socio-economic inequalities. Around 75 per 
cent of young people in urban areas are from households in which the parents have less than 10 years of 
schooling. On average, more than 45 per cent of them do not reach the educational threshold required for 
gaining a decent livelihood, which is currently around 12 years of schooling given some variation between 
countries (see Figure 3). In rural areas, opportunities for young people are even more limited: around 80 
per cent do not attain the threshold level, even though this level is lower.15
Despite the signiﬁ  cant extension of educational coverage that had taken place throughout the Lat-
in American region over the previous 15 years, the proportion of young people who signiﬁ  cantly exceed 
the educational level of their parents is low. This shows that inter-generational carry-over of educational 
achievement is still a dominant factor.16 The average number of years of schooling of young people has 
risen from 7.1 to 10.4 years in urban areas and from 3.0 to 6.8 years in rural areas. Nevertheless, young 
15  For rural areas, the threshold for children is 9 years, while for their parents, less than 6 years of schooling was 
considered inadequate.
16  Although there are other important factors, such as household demography, property and employment, for most 
people, education is the main factor determining their opportunities for future well-being.
Figure 3:
Educational attainment of youths aged 20-24 compared 
with their parents in Latin America (in per cent)
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people from the lower social strata have had few opportunities to achieve a level of education that would 
assure them a minimum livelihood level. At present, just over 30 per cent of young people, whose parents 
did not complete primary education, ﬁ  nish secondary school. In contrast, secondary schooling is complet-
ed by 75 per cent of the children of parents who had at least 10 years of schooling.
The link between access to education and social origin suggests that opportunities for young 
people today have already been shaped, to a large extent, by the inequalities of the previous generation. 
This implies a rigid social structure with little real social mobility, which again limits opportunities to 
improve income distribution in the medium term, since the number of years of schooling and quality of 
education are the main means for obtaining well-paid employment. For the majority of young people in 
the region, educational achievement and upward mobility continue to depend on parents’ education and 
household means.
Unfortunately, the inequality of educational opportunities already manifests itself at the primary 
school level. Differences in years of schooling are not the only inequality in educational achievement. The 
quality of education that young people receive also varies with their social origin. Learning levels sig-
niﬁ  cantly differ between students in public schools and those in private schools. Delich (2002) notes that 
the average student in public schools barely learns 50 per cent of the ofﬁ  cial curriculum, but the average 
graduate of a private school has learned close to 100 per cent. Reading and writing tests show that two 
out of ﬁ  ve pupils in the fourth or ﬁ  fth grade, typically from families at a low socio-economic level, do not 
understand what they read. Those who complete more years of education have generally received better 
quality education.
Many governments in the region have carried out educational reforms focused on curricula, 
institutional change and allocation of ﬁ  nancial resources. Such reforms may reduce disparities between 
private and public establishments in terms of student results and educational achievement, and thus reduce 
educational inequalities between different socio-economic strata. A substantial proportion of the educa-
tional inequalities transmitted from one generation to the next is related to the number of years of school-
ing completed, independent of the quality of education received. Attempts to improve education may have 
little effect if not accompanied by policies that lengthen the period that young people remain in the school 
system, since a high proportion do not stay in school for 12 years.
To ensure that young students from poor families remain in school, some countries have es-
tablished programmes that motivate families to ensure their children’s attendance. The Brazilian Bolsa 
Escola and the Mexican Progresa (now called Oportunidades) are examples of such programmes. The 
Bolsa Escola gives a monetary bonus to low-income families with children between 6 and 15 years who 
attend school. The Mexican system is more comprehensive in making transfers to poor rural families 
for children between the third year of primary and the third year of secondary school, with the transfers 
increasing with the number of years. To receive money for nutrition and educational materials, families 
must: enrol their children below 18 in school; guarantee their regular attendance; enrol in and regularly 
use the corresponding local health service; attend regular lectures on education and health; and use the 
monetary assistance for their children’s nutrition. Specially trained state employees supervise compliance 
with these conditions. Since 2002, the programme has increased the coverage of beneﬁ  ts at the secondary 
and university levels and in poor urban areas.18  DESA Working Paper No. 22
Real income associated with years of schooling is lower now than in the 1980s. In fact, the 
increase in average years of study that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s did not increase per capita 
income per se. Most young people with between 9 and 11 years of schooling still only have access to oc-
cupations that provide insufﬁ  cient well-being. This suggests that, as the coverage of secondary education 
has increased, the value of education in securing a livelihood has declined. The signiﬁ  cant concentration 
of individuals with 13 or more years of schooling in occupations that provide adequate well-being under-
scores that this is an important educational threshold. Clearly, it is important to orient educational reforms 
to improving educational equity for children and adolescents from the lower-income social strata. Howev-
er, reforms of the school system will not beneﬁ  t those already aged 20 or more, who will constitute more 
than two-thirds of the labour force in the region within the next two decades.
Health and housing
As discussed above, the poor in Latin America have not only the lowest income, and the worst opportuni-
ties for education, but the health sector also reveals a similar intergenerational persistence of poverty and 
inequality. The poor are especially susceptible to health problems, due to low incomes, poor sanitation, 
and low-quality housing and working conditions. Limited access to public health services exacerbates 
their health problems.
In the 1990s, governments in the region increased their expenditure on health, as did the private 
sector, and the ﬁ  nancing increased for non-governmental organization activity. Increased public health 
expenditure is still insufﬁ  cient to enable the public sector to cope with the increasing demand for health 
services. As in the case of education, some progress has been made, although these indicators do not re-
ﬂ  ect the variation in progress between social groups. The rate of infant mortality has fallen from 42 to 32 
per thousand live births, while life expectancy has risen from 67 to 70 years, and sanitation facilities have 
improved.
In the 1990s, governments in the Latin American region made efforts to improve public services. 
Access to electricity, water and sanitation improved signiﬁ  cantly in most countries. Although ﬁ  gures vary 
according to the standards used, access to safe water increased from 79 to 85 per cent, while access to 
sanitation increased from 74 to 82 per cent. In most of these cases, wider coverage beneﬁ  ted poor house-
holds and therefore contributed to increased equity.
The issues of overcrowding and poor quality in housing are more difﬁ  cult to deal with. Poor 
neighbourhoods, due especially to their lack of schools and health services, tend to create conditions that 
entrench poverty from generation to generation. Furthermore, social discrimination makes it difﬁ  cult for 
job-seekers from poor neighbourhoods to ﬁ  nd good jobs.
Unregulated urbanization in many Latin American cities has created serious problems and left 
many neighbourhoods without basic infrastructure. Meanwhile, rising land prices have forced the poor to 
move further away from town centres. In the 1980s and 1990s, the shift from rural to urban poverty con-
tinued as the absolute number of the poor increased. The quality of life of the poor deteriorated, attended 
by problems such as growing insecurity, rising crime, drug trafﬁ  cking and overcrowding. The cost of deal-
ing with these problems has been high, undermining the commitment to poverty alleviation.Equity in Latin America Since the 1990s  19
Increased social protection and reduction of risk
The debt crises of the 1980s, greater macroeconomic vulnerability in the 1990s as well as adjustment 
policies and reforms have all increased the vulnerability of the poor, often increasing drop-out rates and 
problems of nutrition and health. When critical situations arise, social protection may be pursued through 
public assistance to individuals, households and communities to ensure access to basic social services.
For the non-poor, insurance is a classic instrument against risk. For families and communities, 
social solidarity can be an effective tool against risk. However, for the poor, the possibilities for such soli-
darity are often limited. Although the public sector has supported the poor with emergency jobs, monetary 
subsidies, school assistance, food assistance, as well as childcare and health services, these traditional 
instruments were insufﬁ  cient to deal with the crises in Latin America of the 1980s and 1990s.
Governments have introduced new programmes to reinforce these instruments. Unemployment 
insurance operates in few countries and offers very limited beneﬁ  ts. Presently, proposals to enhance this 
type of insurance include the need for employee savings, retrenchment of beneﬁ  ts, and free access to cer-
tain social services for the unemployed. Other alternatives—such as credit for the unemployed and funds 
ﬁ  nanced by both employees and employers—are easier to ﬁ  nance.
Ofﬁ  cial ﬁ  gures show that, in 1999, 217 million persons in the region were not covered by social 
security. The nature of the labour market and the effects of unemployment due to crises are quite different 
across countries. Therefore, possible policies for social protection vary signiﬁ  cantly. Recently, increased 
attention has been given to providing health services and covering social security contributions for the 
poor. Other policies include training and retraining for people who have lost their job.
Special funds to alleviate poverty, ﬁ  rst introduced in reaction to the effects of the adjustment 
policies of the late 1980s, were reintroduced in the 1990s. Their focus on serving families in extreme 
situations and their relative autonomy distinguish these funds from other instruments. These funds oper-
ate through projects and require the beneﬁ  ciaries to cooperate by contributing work or their own land 
as inputs. The main challenges are to identify those living in extreme poverty, to engage consultants to 
scrutinize and supervise projects, and to establish bureaucratic links with different public and non-public 
organizations.
Many of these funds have become permanent. The role of the funds is related to particular situa-
tions that require quick intervention and new institutional mechanisms that are more ﬂ  exible and efﬁ  cient. It 
has become clear that mechanisms for social protection must complement positive effects of economic and 
social policies, but cannot by themselves solve the perplexing problems of equity. Social protection should 
not be ﬁ  nanced from a reduction in other social expenditure, which is, in essence, anti-cyclical in nature.
The public debate on equity
The Latin American region experienced important political changes during the 1980s and 1990s. In the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s, many countries in the region were governed by authoritarian regimes. The 1990s 
was an unprecedented decade in which almost the entire region had democratic regimes. Equity is a basic 
component of democracy, and progress in political and citizenship participation constitutes an important 
aspect of equity. UNDP’s 2004 report on democracy in Latin America in the previous twenty years points 
to the relative strength of democracy in Latin America.20  DESA Working Paper No. 22
The functioning of democracy has changed signiﬁ  cantly since the ﬁ  rst three post-war decades in 
terms of the relative power of economic and social actors. Economic change has been accompanied by a 
decline in the power of unions and those political parties associated with labour, a weakening of labour and 
a reduction of the public sector, while the power of large-scale private enterprises has been reinforced. There 
has been a signiﬁ  cant loss of government autonomy. As mentioned above, government freedom to imple-
ment economic and social policy has been limited by explicit or implicit conditionalities imposed by credi-
tors—such as international ﬁ  nancial institutions, other foreign economic actors, as well as foreign govern-
ments—or by supposedly voluntary government commitments.
Control of communications has become more important for the consolidation of power, involving 
modern technology and closer association of powerful economic interests, as evidenced by the high cost of 
political campaigns and lobbying. The media have also contributed to the establishment of new consump-
tion patterns favouring transnational enterprises and increasing their control of markets.
Public debate on equity has evolved in this context of concentrated power. In the past, political 
parties in many countries used to design programmes that proposed major social changes. In recent years, 
however, transnational media have promoted liberal values associated with individualism, to the detri-
ment of the collective interest. Polls have gradually become more important in gauging and shaping public 
opinion. Governments have become increasingly involved in appearing to be responsive to the population, 
instead of debating alternative social, economic and political programmes with other political parties. There 
is a need to promote more substantive citizen participation in public affairs (ECLAC, 2000b). Until recently, 
conﬁ  dence prevailed that economic growth and public expenditure would solve the problems of poverty and 
inequality, but now, doubts have become widespread.
Neoliberals have pointed to certain positive outcomes of the recent economic changes and social 
policies as proof that their policies have beneﬁ  ted the majority of the population, especially the poor. The 
2000 round of population and housing censuses have shown that the structure of consumption has changed 
considerably, especially in terms of access to durable goods, while public sector infrastructure expenditure 
has signiﬁ  cantly increased access to safe water, sanitation and electricity. Progress has been made on these 
issues in all countries, despite variations in per capita income and growth.
However, critics claim that the poor quality of education, health, infrastructure and security as 
well as drug abuse and criminality in poor neighbourhoods are the results of those same neoliberal poli-
cies. Other problems that critics ascribe to neoliberal ideology include increased unemployment, lower 
wages and the vulnerability of small enterprises. The devaluation of education as a guarantee of income and 
security has also created dissatisfaction among young people and their families. The stagnation of per capita 
income during between 1999 and 2003 has strengthened critics of the prevailing system. In this context, the 
principle of equity has gained political momentum.
The Latinobarómetro is an annual survey that gathers opinions on topics associated with values, 
actors and equity covering 17 Latin American countries. The Latinobarómetro surveys of 2002 and 2003 
showed the following results regarding values and the functioning of institutions.17 Although democracy 
was preferred to authoritarian regimes (7 to 2), only 32 per cent in 2002 and 29 per cent in 2003 were 
satisﬁ  ed with government performance. Conﬁ  dence in government was below 50 per cent with very few 
exceptions, while conﬁ  dence in legislatures and political parties was even weaker.
17  See press releases, Latinobarómetro 2002 and 2003. http://www.latinobarometro.org.Equity in Latin America Since the 1990s  21
In relation to the respective roles of the State and the market, half the respondents believed that 
development was more important than democracy; 66 per cent believed that the market economy was 
a better option than State intervention; however, only 24 per cent in 2002 and 16 per cent in 2003 were 
satisﬁ  ed with the actual performance of the market economy. In 2003, only 22 per cent believed that 
privatization had been good for the country, down from 46 per cent in 1998, and 28 per cent in 2002. In 
2002, 70 per cent believed that the State should be in charge of providing electricity, water, health and 
other social services, while 21 per cent preferred these services to be in the hands of the private sector; 53 
per cent believed that they would attain the level of welfare they desired in less than 10 years, while 67 
per cent believed that their countries would need more than 10 years or would never develop; 56 per cent 
considered the economic situation of the country bad or very bad, and 48 per cent believed it was worse 
or much worse than in previous years; 57 per cent believed that their parents had been better off than they 
were themselves. Among problems felt to be the worst, unemployment, low wages and poverty accounted 
for more than 50 per cent, while 80 per cent of respondents judged the current income distribution to be 
unfair or very unfair. These opinions have been reﬂ  ected in election results since 2000. Although democ-
racy and a mixed market economy are desired as institutions, there is discontent with the way they have 
been functioning so far.
The economic stagnation during the ﬁ  ve-year period, 1999-2003, is reﬂ  ected in opinions that are 
increasingly critical of the system. Social unrest has increased and many political candidates strongly 
critical of prevalent economic and social policies have been elected. However, due to existing power struc-
tures, many newly elected ofﬁ  cials have been unable to implement desired changes.
Most social and political actors strongly defend democracy. The signiﬁ  cant change today as 
compared to earlier attitudes is a desire for stronger public policies for poverty alleviation and equality, 
at least in terms of opportunity. For the ﬁ  rst time in many years, prevailing policies have been challenged 
in Argentina and Venezuela, and the principle of a new distribution of the costs of the economic crisis has 
been introduced.
The need for economic growth and economic transformation conducive to growth was also 
clearly stated during the Copenhagen Summit:
“To create a favourable economic environment that would help to bring about more equitable 
access to all income levels, resources and social services”, to promote “dynamic, open and free 
markets, while recognizing at the same time the need to intervene in the market, as and when nec-
essary, to prevent or stop markets from falling, to promote stability and long-term investments, to 
ensure fair competition and ethical conduct, and to harmonize economic and social development” 
(UN, 1996).
Patricio Aylwin, then President of Chile, stated in an address on 28 June 2000 on the occasion 
of the Copenhagen Plus 5 Conference in Geneva, “Moreover, civil society in most developing countries 
lacks the necessary organization and power to have effective inﬂ  uence on such matters, while the sorely 
needed and long hoped-for resources of the wealthy nations to be given in assistance to the poor countries 
are far from reaching the needed levels”.22  DESA Working Paper No. 22
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